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NOTES
COMPETITION, THE RIGHT TO COPY AND
SECONDARY MEANING
Traditionally, fair and unfair methods of competing for business
by use of trademarks, tradenames, product or package designs and
features and advertising slogans have hinged on the capacity of
these devices to identify the source of the product or service, or the
ownership of the business, to which they refer." A central issue in
most of these cases is whether the trade device in question indicates,
or is capable of indicating, source or ownership.
A number of cases, beginning with the 1918 Supreme Court de-
cision in International News Serv. v. Associated Press,2 departed
from these traditional notions of unfair competition and have pro-
tected the exclusive use of trade devices regardless of the fact that
the source or ownership of the product, service or business was not
in any way involved.3 Other cases, to varying degrees, have made
similar departures.4 In some instances, the courts were unaware that
the decisions were not based on traditional notions of unfair com-
petition.5
The purpose of this note is to analyze some of these cases, to ex-
amine the extent to which they depart from the traditional notions of
1. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916) ; Elgin Nat'l Watch
Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kil-
born & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917) ; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfleld,
198 Fed. 369 (6th Cir. 1912). See generally 1 NI ms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADE-MARxS § 201 (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as NIms].
2. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
3. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Rest., Inc., 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1961);
Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953) ;
Christian Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), affd m em.,
2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
4. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1962) cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. Week 3337 (U.S. April 15, 1963) (No. 836); Stork
Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Avon Periodicals, Inc.
v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 113 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div.
200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1953). See also John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of
Notre Dame Du Lac, 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 269
(N.D. Ind. 1957). See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 CoLum. L. Rsv. 809 (1935).
5. See, e.g., Mastercrafts Clock & Radio Co. v. Yacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955),
-reversing 119 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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unfair competition, to explore possible rationales for the decisions
and to suggest limitations and policies with regard to the problems
underlying them.e
I. THE RIGHT TO COPY
It is a familiar statement that encouraging competition is a basic
policy of American law." One way in which that basic policy is
promoted is by encouraging the right to engage in business and seek
custom,8 for the entry (or threat of entry) of new competitors into
the market, and their ability to take custom from those already there,
are significant forces in promoting competition. A person is priv-
ileged to cause economic injury to a competitor by acts done in exer-
cise of his right to compete.9 Such a privilege is necessary if com-
petition is to exist, because economic injury to a competitor is an in-
evitable companion of competition. But if his acts are not calculated
to obtain custom, he is not exercising his right to compete.'0 He is
liable for economic injury to a "competitor" caused by his acts under
such circumstances because he has not brought himself within the
protection of the policy of promoting competition. Clothing his acts
in the garments of competition is no defense."
But permitting economic injury to a competitor is not the only tool
implementing the policy of encouraging competition; permitting one
to copy is another. 2 As it is necessary to permit economic injury
6. For an interesting analysis of secondary meaning in the law of unfair
competition, see Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest: Second-
ary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. Rzv. 935 (1962).
7. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 1 (1950).
8. Id. at 92. The Supreme Court stated "The right to follow any of the com-
mon occupations of life is an inalienable right." Butchers' Union Slaughter-House
and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-
House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884). RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 708-09 (1938)
states the common law governing the privilege to enter the market as a com-
petitor.
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 708 (1938). See OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 100.
10. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§ 709 (1938).
11. Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911) ; Tuttle v.
Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
12. See, e.g., Swank, Inc. v. Anson, Inc., 196 F.2d 330 (1st Cir. 1952); Chas.
D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952); A. C.
Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1930); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247
Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917); Keystone Type Foundry v. Portland Pub. Co., 186 Fed.
690 (1st Cir. 1911). Comment, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 652 ("the common law starts
with the premise that one is priviledged to copy the design of his competitor's
product ... .").
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generally to enable the pursuit of the right to compete, so it is neces-
sary to permit one to copy his competitors' products. Not to permit
copying would be to give a monopoly to the originator of the prod-
uct;13 permitting copying places pressures on him to keep the price
of his product low, its quality up and his services adequate.
Product copying is not the only form of copying which is necessary
for competition. 14 A person must also be permitted to copy the words
and other devices used in marketing the product." To permit, for
example, a person to have the exclusive privilege of using the word
"tire" in marketing his particular brand of tires, would certainly
cripple the marketing efforts of other sellers of tires.20 Even if a per-
son coins a word which becomes particularly helpful in marketing,
his competitors should be permitted to copy that word in order to be
able to compete effectively with the originator. For example, suppose
a person begins using the word "Kantleek" for hot water containers.
Another person selling the same product would be at a disadvantage
if he were not allowed to use such word.
The right to copy, then, is of basic importance to the maintenance
of competition. 7 As viewed between the originator and the copier, the
right to copy often seems to be grossly unfair. The originator has
in many instances spent huge amounts of money developing a new
product or marketing device. s The copier is permitted to secure with
little expense most of the benefits the originator secured., As be-
13. See, e.g., Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Commonwealth v.
Petty, 96 Ky. 452, 29 S.W. 291 (1895).
14. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 6, at 950 nn.69 & 70, for an interesting
analysis of the purpose behind granting patents.
15. See e.g., Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665,
673 (1901) ; Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871) ; 1 Niis § 200.
16. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871). (A person may
not take as a trade-mark "a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an
article of trade of its qualities, ingredients or characteristics ...
17. See note 12 supra.
18. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918); Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir. 1962); Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Rest., Inc., 291 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1961); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955),
,reversing 119 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati,
166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Santa's Workship, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div.
328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953); Christian Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
Although one is required only to be the first user, as between himself and the
copier, to receive protection, the equities of the case are particularly unbalanced
when the plaintiff has originated and developed the copied device.
19. See note 18 supra.
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tween these two, the right to copy appears to promote a policy of
punishing the industrious and rewarding the lazy.20 Such may be its
immediate effect, but it is premised on the expectation that ultimately
it will be beneficial to competition-if not possibly essential to it21
Thus, the right to compete includes the right to copy. 22 Exceptions
to the right to copy have, however, been formulated when the policy
for them outweighed the policy behind the right to copy. 23
II. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO COPY
Two exceptions to the right to copy appear in the law of patents
and copyrights.2 4 A patent confers a product monopoly: that is, it
confers an exclusive privilege to manufacture, sell and use a product.2 5
The rationale for granting a patent is the encouragement of inven-
tion . 2  During the limited period of its duration, a patent monopoly
interferes with the full exercise by others of their rights to compete,
including the right to copy. 27
Trademarks and tradenames are regarded by some writers as
monopolies, similar to patants.2 8 They are not product monopolies,
however, because a competitor is free to copy the product which
these trade devices identify.2 9 He is not free to copy the identifying
symbol and use it on a competing or related product. To this extent,
the right to copy is restricted. Because, unlike a patent monopoly,
such restrictions can be perpetual, they could be severe limitations
upon competition. The next section will demonstrate that while
trademarks and tradenames do limit a competitor's right to copy,
the ultimate effect is to facilitate the exercise of the right to compete,
not to restrict it. When retained within the traditional theories of
protection, a trademark or tradename does not bestow a monopoly
in the sense a patent does.
20. See note 18 supra.
21. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
22. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
23. See generally Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1940) ; Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160 (2d Cir. 1904) ; Young & Chaffee Furni-
ture Co. v. Chaffee Bros. Furniture Co., 204 Mich. 293, 170 N.W. 48 (1918).
24. General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891, 893 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 268
U.S. 705 (1925).
25. See note 13 supra.
26. See note 13 supra.
27. See note 13 supra.
28. See generally 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 65
(2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN].
29. For a very interesting discussion of the point see CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56-62 (6th ed. 1948), reprinted in OPPEN-
HEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12-17.
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A. Trademarks and Tradenames: The Need to Identify Source
The law of trademarks and tradenames is usually regarded as a
part of the law of "unfair competition, '30 which includes, in addition,
protection against "palming off" the goods of one person as those of
a competitor.32 Palming off is not of concern here, because it is Xiot
related to the right of a competitor to copy. The bulk of the law of
unfair competition is concerned with protection given in the form of
either trademarks or tradenames.
A trademark is any symbol which is used to identify the source,
origin, or ownership of a product and which is affixed to that prod-
uct.32 To qualify as a trademark, a symbol must be arbitrary with
respect to the product to which it is affixed. 33 If a symbol is non-
arbitrary, a competitor will need to use it; for example, if it de-
scribes the product or its qualities, the competitor will need to use
it to describe his product.3 4 On the other hand, if the symbol is
arbitrary, a competitor has no need to copy it. His only purpose in
copying must be to mislead purchasers into thinking that his product
comes from his competitor-a sophisticated "palming off." Therefore,
if a symbol which otherwise qualified as a trademark is arbitrary, a
competitor will be prevented from copying it.-3
A tradename is any designation used in connection with goods,
services or a business, which has acquired a special significance as
indicating the source, origin or ownership thereof.3 6 A tradename,
unlike a trademark, can be used with services or a business as well
as with goods; a tradename need not be arbitrary.3 It must, how-
30. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); Elgin Nat'l
Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901); 3 CALLMANN §
67.1, at 1011.
31. See generally 1 NIMS § 4.
32. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 715 (1938).
A trade-mark is any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or com-
bination thereof in any form of arrangement, which (a) is adopted and used
by a person to denominate goods which he markets, and (b) is affixed to
the goods, and (c) is not, except as stated in §§ 720-722, a common or
generic name for the goods or a picture of them, or a geographical, per-
sonal, or corporate or other association name, or a designation descriptive
of the goods or of their quality, ingredients, properties or functions, and
(d) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohibited
neither by legislative enactment nor by an otherwise defined public policy.
33. See note 32 supra.
34. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
35. See note 32 supra. Since the cases analyzed in this note clearly do not
involve trademarks, the concept of traditional notions of unfair competition has
accordingly been limited to traditional tradename doctrines, to the exclusion of
trademarks.
36. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 716 (1938). See generally 1 NIMs §§ 36-42.
37. See note 36 supra.
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ever, have secondary meaning; that is, it must identify the source,
origin or ownership of the goods, services or business with which it
is used.38
Originally, the origin or source indicated by a tradename had to be
the specific origin or ownership of the goods ;35 however, under
modern law, it need merely show "that the goods in connection with
which it is used emanate from the same . . .source ... as certain
other goods that have already given the consumer satisfaction ...."-40
This enables the consumer to re-purchase a product manufactured
or sold by a single company. 41 If a person likes one product from
ABC Company, and if a mark or word enables him to re-purchase
other products manufactured by the same company, then such mark
or word should be protected.4 2 If a person were freely permitted to
copy a tradename, the public might be deceived about the true source
of his product.
43
38. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
39. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 324 (1871) ; Baglin v. Cusenier
Co., 221 U.S. 580, 591 (1911).
40. Schechter, The Rationwi Basis of Trademrk Protection, 40 HARv. L. Rsv.
813, 816 (1927). See also Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed.
960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918); Coty v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 Fed. 264 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 293 Fed. 344 (2d Cir. 1923); 3 CALLMANN § 80.1, at 1359-60 n.12.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. There is nothing abstruse or complicated about this theory, however
difficult its application may sometimes be. It contemplates that a word
or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily, incapable of exclusive
appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geo-
graphically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used
so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article
that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word
or phrase had come to mean that the article was his product; in other
words, had come to be, to them, his trade-mark. So it was said that the
word had come to have a secondary meaning, although this phrase, "sec-
ondary meaning," seems not happily chosen, because, in the limited
field, this new meaning is primary rather than secondary; that is to
say, it is, in that field, the natural meaning. Here, then, is presented a
conflict of right. The alleged trespassing defendant has the right to use
the word, because in its primary sense or original sense the word is
descriptive; but, owing to the fact that the word has come to mean, to
a part of the public, something else, it follows that when the defendant
approaches that same part of the public with the bare word, and with
nothing else, applied to his goods, he deceives that part of the public,
and hence he is required to accompany his use of the bare word with
sufficient distinguishing marks normally to prevent the otherwise
normally resulting fraud. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed.
369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
See generally 1 NIMs § 201.
43. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Coca Cola Co.
v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield,
198 Fed. 369 (6th Cir. 1912); Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel Range
Co., 189 Fed. 26 (6th Cir. 1911) ; Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160 (2d Cir. 1904) ;
Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 Fed. 696 (6th Cir. 1902); Champion
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/6
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An originator of a tradename must prove secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion of the public as to source in order to receive
protection.4 To prove the latter, it must be shown that the public
might reasonably think the goods of the copier are those of the
originator of the tradename. 5 In proving likelihood of confusion it is
evident that this necessarily requires proof of secondary meaning. If
no secondary meaning exists, there can be no source confusion.
B. Limitations on The Exceptions: The Need to Copy
The doctrine of secondary meaning gives the originator (or first
user) of a non-arbitrary mark or word protection from another's
use even though the mark is a geographical term, personal name,
corporate name or descriptive term."6 However, an originator does
not have an absolute right to prevent all copying of non-arbitrary
marks or words that have acquired a secondary meaning. In some
situations the copier has a need to copy such a word or mark; other-
wise he would be unable to compete effectively.
1. Descriptive Terms
Suppose a person uses a descriptive term so long and so ex-
clusively with reference to his product or service that the public con-
nects the descriptive word with that product or service.4 7 However,
the copier of such a word or mark has a need to use it because in
its original sense it is still descriptive of the product or service."
But, because the word or mark has come to mean something else to
the public, when a copier attempts to sell his product using the same
word or mark, with no other distinguishing feature, purchasers will
be deceived about the source of his product."" Therefore, the copier
is required "to accompany his use of the bare word with sufficient
distinguishing marks to prevent the normally resulting fraud."'10
The source value of the originator's word or mark is protected, but
at the same time he is not given a monopoly in the descriptive word.51
Spark Plug Co. v. Master & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Candee, Swan v.
Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439 (1870); George E. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 199 Mass. 99,
85 N.E. 417 (1908) ; Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901).
44. See 3 CALLMANN 1357.
45. Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Fidelity Mortgage Co., 12 F.2d 582 (6th
Cir. 1926). See 3 CALLiANN 1359.
46. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
48. 1 Nims § 37, at 154. ("one may properly use for his own product any
descriptive words, because such words are of public or common right").
49. 1 NIms §§ 37 & 41.
50. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
51. If a word has a subordinate meaning to the public as indicating the origin
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Geographical Terms
Protection is given geographical terms which have acquired second-
ary meaning; however, it is imperative that the term be carefully
examined.52 For example, suppose people in Vermont are selling
marble under the name "Vermont Marble." The public wants Ver-
mont marble. Can a person in New Hampshire sell the same quality
marble, mined in New Hampshire, as "Vermont Marble?" To answer
this question it must be determined what the public thinks "Vermont
Marble" means.
If the public thinks that "Vermont Marble" is marble of a partic-
ular quality, then the person in New Hampshire could sell his marble
as "Vermont Marble." The reason is that the term is descriptive of
the product, and if copying were prohibited the originator would
have an effective monopoly. If the public thinks "Vermont Marble"
means marble mined in Vermont, then the person in New Hampshire
could not sell New Hampshire marble as "Vermont Marble." To do
so would deceive the public.
In a situation in which "Vermont Marble," by long use, has de-
veloped a secondary meaning, identifying a single source and origin
of marble sold under the name of "Vermont Marble," the originator
of the name should be protected. 53 Copiers should be made to take
such reasonable precautions as are practicable to prevent public de-
ception."' The courts do not give absolute injunctions in situations in
which a secondary meaning was found to exist for the originator's
geographic word or mark, but they do try to define the rights and
balance the conflicting interests.5 5
of the product, but the primary significance of the word in the minds of the
public is the product itself, then the prior user gets no protection. See Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111-18 (1938), where "shredded wheat" was
held to be a generic term. "A generic name gives information as to the nature
or class of article. A descriptive word supplies the characteristics of the article,
its color, order, dimensions, functions, possibly its ingredients." 1 NiMs § 41,
at 166.
52. American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85,
53 N.E. 141 (1899). See 1 Nims § 37.
53. Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901);
Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 (1893); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 311 (1871).
54. American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85,
53 N.E. 141 (1899).
55. See OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 199 for cases illustrative of the
court's attempts to define the rights and balance the conflicting interests.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/6
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3. Personal and Corporate Names
A personal name cannot be exclusively appropriated by anyone,
thereupon preventing others from using the same personal name."
The property interest in a person's personal name can be several.
First, it can be the reputation of the source of a particular product
or service. Second, it might be the personal reputation of the man
himself. For these reasons, an individual needs to use his own
name, even if this results in copying another's personal name. T
However, if the copier has no great economic value in his name, then
the policy behind letting him use it merely because he was "born
with it," has disappeared. The courts usually look to whether one's
use of his own name indicates fraud or bad faith.58 "The question
is whether his [the copier's] use is reasonable and honest, or is
calculated to deceive."
59
Normally, a corporation can not get an absolute injunction to stop
a second corporation from adopting the same corporate name. 0
However, more protection is given to the originator of a specific
corporate name than is given to an originator of a personal name.0 1
The need to copy a specific corporate name is less than in situations
involving personal names. 2 A person is born with his personal name,
while a corporate name is selected.6 3 A copier of a corporate name
must either successfully distinguish his corporate name or select a
new name.
64
4. Functional and Non-functional Features
Courts in the early 1900's recognized that the number of suitable
colors, sizes and shapes a particular product can take are sometimes
limited, so that to limit copying would create a monopoly in the first
56. See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118
(1905).
57. Ibid.
58. In some cases a finding of fraud or bad faith in the use of one's own name
has caused the court to grant an absolute injunction. Hoyt Heater Co. v. Hoyt, 68
Cal. App. 2d 523, 157 P.2d 657 (1945). Other courts have granted only qualified
injunctions. R. B. Davis Co. v. Davis, 11 F. Supp. 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1935), modified,
75 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1935). Still other courts have granted absolute injunctions
absent an express finding of fraud. Riggs Optical Co. v. Riggs, 132 Neb. 26, 270
N.W. 667 (1937).
59. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118 (1905).
60. See generally Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d
35 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 684 (1940).
61. Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 78 Pac. 879 (1904).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
Washington University Open Scholarship
SECONDARY MEANING
appropriator.05 In Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 66 the court
held that the copying of the plaintiff's bookcases did not constitute un-
fair competition. The defendant imitated the sizes, styles, material
and finish of plaintiff's bookcases, but the court said this was per-
missible, since otherwise "it would be impossible . .. [for the de-
fendant] to construct and sell a bookcase having the most desirable
characteristics." 7
Although the courts in these early cases did not discuss the necessity
of plaintiff proving that the copied feature had acquired secondary
meaning, it seems reasonable to assume that the courts were concerned
with preventing source confusion.8  Some writers have taken the posi-
tion that the courts did not require the originator to show secondary
meaning. 9 However, it would seem more tenable that the courts
merely were putting the burden on defendant to justify his copying
of plaintiff's product. The copier had to show that his copying was
commercially justifiable.7" This burden on the defendant is in conflict
with the original proposition that anyone is privileged to copy unless
there is a good reason for limiting his right.7 The original ground rule
was that the right to copy encourages the right to compete, thereupon
implementing the policy of encouraging competition.7 2
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.,73 articulated and ap-
plied the secondary meaning doctrine to the copying of non-functional
features of goods.74 The court recognized the right to copy absent
a limiting policy such as secondary meaning. In this case, defendant
company manufactured a wrench which was a facsimile of the plain-
tiff's wrench, except that the defendant put his own name on it,
therefore making no attempt to pass off his product as the plaintiff's.
65. See Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Simulation of Rival Goods-The Test of
Commercial Necessity, 3 VILL. L. Rav. 333 (1958). See also 1 NIMS § 134.
66. 119 Fed. 696 (6th Cir. 1902).
67. Id. at 704.
68. Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 Fed. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.
1917) (plaintiff given protection because defendant could have changed his device
to avoid confusion of source without interfering with functional requirements).
69. See Galbally, supra note 65, at 336.
70. See, e.g., Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel Range Co., 189 Fed. 26
(6th Cir. 1911), where defendant was not enjoined from making a close imitation
of the design of plaintiff's gas heater, by making molds of the parts of plaintiff's
heater. The court held the copying commercially necessary. See also Champion
Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); George G.
Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 199 Mass. 99, 85 N.E. 417 (1908).
71. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
73. 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
74. See Galbally, supra note 65, at 339.
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The court refused to grant an injunction because defendant copied a
functional part of the wrench. Any copying of a functional part is
privileged, unless defendant represents himself as plaintiff in the
sale.78
One may freely imitate an unpatented article in all of its functional
elements, so long as this right is not exercised in such a way as to
confuse the public as to the origin of the goods.7 6
The court further stated: "The defendant has as much right to
copy the 'nonfunctional' features of the article as any others, so
long as they have not become associated with the plaintiff as manu-
facturer or source."77 Therefore, copying a non-functional part is
privileged unless two things are shown by the originator: first, that
a certain feature of plaintiff's product has acquired secondary mean-
ing, thereupon identifying the source of the product to prospective
buyers; second, that buyers are likely to confuse the imitation with
the original. This confusion presumably would cause a decline in
plaintiff's sales.78 Subsequent cases have followed the doctrine estab-
lished in the Crescent Tool case.70
meaning of functional and non-functional features is not clear. Func-
tional features have been described as elements of mechanical con-
struction 0 and inventive features 8' which are necessary for the suc-
cessful practical operation of,8 2 and to reduce the cost of manufactur-
ing, the article.8 3 Functional elements in this sense are "utilitarian."
A problem exists in trying to apply the above doctrine, because the
It has been stated that a functional element is the necessary result of
an effort to comply with the physical requirements essential to com-
75. This is commonly called "palming off" or "passing off."
76. 3 CAIMmANN 1255 & n.97.
77. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917).
78. This means a presumption of damages. See, e.g., Pure Foods, Inc. v.
Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954).
79. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Upjohn Co. v.
Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920). See also West Point
Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
840 (1955); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F.2d 957 (3rd Cir.
1943) ; American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1942) ;
Chun King Sales, Inc. v. Oriental Foods, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
odified, 244 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1957).
80. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160 (2d Cir. 1904); Luminous Unit Co. V.
R. Williamson & Co., 241 Fed. 265 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 245 Fed. 988 (7th Cir. 1917).
81. See Stewart v. Hudson, 222 Fed. 584 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
82. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 Fed. 160 (2d Cir. 1904).
83. Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. United States Expansion Bolt Co., 177
App. Div. 554, 164 N.Y.S. 433 (1917).
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mercial success.8 4 However, this definition simply confuses the prob-
lem, because commercial success might very well depend on some
kind of incidental feature which is merely ornamental. For example,
people might buy a certain pair of coveralls simply because of a
butterfly insignia on the front. Commercial success of such cover-
alls depends upon the incidental, ornamental feature; however, ap-
plying the definition of functional in the "utilitarian" sense, the
originator of such insignia would be able to prevent the copying.
Such an incidental feature would be considered a non-functional fea-
ture, thereupon prohibiting copying. Apparently, Judge Hand in the
Crescent Tool case interpreted the phrase non-functional to mean non-
operational in the utilitarian sense, as evidenced by a prior opinion.,5
Additional factors necessary in considering which definition of func-
tional would best implement the policy of encouraging competition
are noted in the conclusion.
Several conclusions can be formulated in regard to functional and
non-functional features which necessarily weigh the interests be-
tween the need to copy and traditional exceptions to the right to
copy. First, if the copied feature is non-functional and has acquired
secondary meaning, then the copier must take successful steps to
distinguish his product as coming from a different source. If this
is impossible, the originator can obtain an injunction. If the copied
feature is functional and has acquired secondary meaning then the
copier must take reasonable steps to distinguish the source of the
product. However, if it is impossible to distinguish the source of
the two products, then the originator can not obtain an injunction.
There are two reasons why more protection is given a functional
feature that has acquired a secondary meaning than a non-functional
feature.88 First, if no one could copy a functional feature, there could
be no competition. Second, a non-functional feature need not be
copied in order to compete with the originator. The inference is that
the copier intends to confuse the public as to the true source of his
product.
84. See Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. American Ever-Ready Co., 195 Fed. 931
(2d Cir. 1912).
85. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1916). However, in J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949
(8th Cir. 1941), the court stated that a design might not be functional in a
"utilitarian" sense, but is nevertheless functional in that it contributes materially
in the sale of the goods.
86. Remember the two definitions of "functional" discussed in note 80 supra
and accompanying text. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 741 (b) (ii) (1938).
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III. A NEW EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT TO COPY
Defendants have been enjoined from copying an originator's work
and effort on grounds that they should not get a "free ride" or have
an unfair advantage in competing with the originator. T The origina-
tors, in these cases, had spent large amounts of money developing the
marketing device, building prestige or gathering news. The courts
wanted to protect this investment even though no confusion of source
was involved.89
In International News Serv. v. Associated Press.,, plaintiff gathered
news through its own efforts and expense for the purpose of dis-
semination to its correspondents throughout the country. The de-
fendant read early editions of papers published by some of plaintiff's
members and relayed the same news to defendant's members. The
court held such practice to be unfair competition, and enjoined the
defendant from further activities. The injunction was granted even
though the defendant did not attempt to palm off his goods as those
of the plaintiff or in any way cause confusion of source or origin of
the news. Thus, protection could not be given under traditional ex-
ceptions to the right to copy.90
Defendant argued that all property right in uncopyrighted literary
matters, and more particularly news, are lost after publication and
dedication to the public, and may, thereafter, be used by anyone.
"The Supreme Court refused to consider whether there was any
property in the news matter at common law... and decided the case
solely on the theory of unfair competition in business."'- The empha-
sis in this case was placed upon a fairness test and the defendant's
activities were unfair in the eyes of the court.
The decision in the International News Service case has been widely
discussed. Few courts have accepted it, while most have construed it
narrowly, limiting it to its facts. Other courts have flatly rejected
its broader implications. In Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,92 the
87. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1919); Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Rest., Inc., 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1961); Mastercrafts Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955), reversing
119 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348
(9th Cir. 1948) ; Christian Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup.
Ct.), af'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956) ; Santa's Workshop,
Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1956).
88. See note 87 supra.
89. 248 U.S. 215 (1957).
90. See discussion of traditional exceptions to the right to copy Part II, supra.
91. 2 CALLILA N 877. See also Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Un-
fair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1958).
92. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
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court refused to enjoin the defendant from copying the plaintiff's
silk designs. Subsequent to the copying, defendant undercut the
plaintiff's prices, thereby damaging his business. The court stated
that the International News 93 case did not introduce a new general
doctrine. In 1956, the New York courts apparently altered their
policy of narrowly construing the International News decision. The
plaintiff was awarded an injunction against a copier of its dress de-
signs9" However, the court based its decision onthe fact that the
defendant had copied the designs prior to their being made public.9 5
Therefore, all the court did was defer the time of publication of the
designs.9 6
The controversies surrounding the application of the International
News Service" doctrine to cases involving similar or dissimilar facts
and circumstances still rage today, but it is evident that courts apply
the doctrine only when it is impossible to grant relief on a theory of
"palming off" or secondary meaning. For instance, in 1961, the
second Circuit Court of Appeals in Lincoln Rest. Corp. v. Wolfies
Rest., Inc9 s enjoined the defendant from using the name "Wolfies"
for his Brooklyn restaurant because the plaintiff had built up his
reputation in Miami using the same name. Although the court found
no secondary meaning of "Wolfies" in the Brooklyn area, it held
that the defendant intended to trade on the plaintiff's reputation,
and noted "no distinction between this and ordinary 'palming-off' in
a products case." 99
However, under traditional exceptions to the right to copy, it is
necessary to show secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion. 1"0
The court found no secondary meaning of "Wolfies" in the Brooklyn
area; it would therefore be impossible for anyone to be confused.
The only interest being protected by the court was plaintiff's prior
expenditure to advertise "Wolfies" in the Miami area.
In Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling,101 the plaintiff operated a
93. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
94. Christian Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd nwm., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
95. The plaintiff tried to confine the showing of the dresses to a select group.
96. This was an ordinary equity breach of confidence case. It should be noted
that "the doctrine preventing copists from exploiting 'nonfunctional features' is
very likely inapplicable since women's fashions are probably too transitory to
acquire a secondary meaning (public recognition of dresses original source)." 70
HARV. L. REv. 1117, 1118-19 (1957).
97. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
98. 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1961).
99. Id. at 303.
100. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
101. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953).
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comprehensively advertised business known as Santa's Workshop.
Santa was pictured sitting on a mountain, and the advertising fea-
tured a unique design of Santa with other clever characteristics. The
court sustained the plaintiff's averment that defendant copied the
design which deceived the public and amounted to plagiarism of
plaintiff's advertising. The court, however, recognized that plain-
tiff's design had not acquired secondary meaning. But how could the
public have been deceived when the plaintiff's design admittedly had
no secondary meaning? The court answered that the test is whether
the acts by the copier are fair or unfair according to equity principles.
Such a test, however, would not recognize the scope and limitations
of protection given under the traditional exceptions to the right to
copy.
A recent decision in the Fifth Circuit illustrates the growing state of
confusion in cases similar to the ones discussed. The court held in
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anhbeuser-Busch, Inc., that it was un-
fair competition for defendant to use the slogan "Where there's life
... there's bugs," in sale of combined floor wax and insecticide, when
the plaintiff already had used the registered slogan, "Where there's
life.., there's Bud" in the sale of "Budweiser" beer.102 The manufac-
turer's floor wax and plaintiff's beer were not competing products.
Although it was found that the public knew plaintiff's slogan, asso-
ciated the slogan with the product, associated plaintiff as the source
of the advertising, and found a likelihood of confusion, dicta indicates
the existence of confusion by the court. It stated that the "gist of
this action is that the plaintiff has a property interest in the slogan,
built up at great expense .... . 1o 3 The court apparently thought that
the mere existence of plaintiff's expense for advertising the slogan
was sufficient to warrant protection even though no secondary mean-
ing was acquired. The court also mentioned that plaintiff could be
damaged "by reason of the peculiarly unwholesome association of
ideas when the word 'bugs' was substituted in the slogan for the
word, 'Bud,' referring to a food product."' 04
IV. POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR THE NEW EXCEPTION
A. Dilution and Intrinsic Symbol Value
Proponents of the dilution theory state that the more widely a
symbol is used, the less effective it will be for the originator.'00 The
102. 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1962).
103. Ibid.
104. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir. 1962).
105. 3 CALL1iANN § 84.2.
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first user's injury is in the dilution of the distinctiveness of the
symbol or design.10 6 The injury is to the property of the plaintiff.101
The gravamen of a dilution complaint is that the continuous
use of a mark similar to plaintiff's works an inexorably adverse
effect upon the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's mark, and that,
if he is powerless to prevent such use, his mark will lose its
distinctiveness entirely. This injury differs materially from that
arising out of the orthodox confusion; in the event that the sim-
ilarity between the marks in question provokes confusion, there
is an immediate or imminent loss of sales, for the confusion
tends to divert potential customers from the plaintiff to the de-
fendant. Such confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilu-
tion is an infection which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably
destroy the advertising value of the mark. The uniqueness of
singularity of the trade-mark will sometimes be more important
to the success of an advertising campaign than the quality of the
product with which it is connected.0 8
However, the dilution theory has not been accepted by the courts as
a foundation for a cause of action.109 The American theories are
founded upon the doctrines of palming-off and confusion of source,
whereas under the dilution theory neither competition between two
products, palming-off nor confusion of source is involved." i0 Protec-
tion under the dilution theory is urged on the grounds that the plain-
tiff's symbol is his property and any use of such symbol will injure
his property rights.
Middleton states that to have a true dilution situation:
1) the mark must be arbitrary, coined or fanciful and substan-
tially the same mark used by both parties;
2) the parties must use this mark on unrelated and non-competi-
tive goods or services; and
3) there must be a complete absence of actual or likely confu-
sion."'
It should be realized that the dilution doctrine will give the originator
of such a mark or symbol a monopoly on its use even though there
106. Ibid.
107. See 3 CALLMANN § 66.3, for a general discussion of the property right in
a trademark.
108. 3 CALLMANN § 84.2, at 1643-44.
109. See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264
N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp.
821 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933); Philadelphia Storage Bat-
tery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See
generally Middleton, Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution, 47 TRADE ARK REP.
1023 (1958).
110. 3 CALLMANN § 84.2.
111. Middleton, supra note 109, at 1025-26.
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is no possibility of public deception. Further, the dilution theory
is not concerned with a competitor having an unfair advantage over
the originator of the mark or symbol. The theory gives protection
absent all traces of competition between the originator and the copier.
Protection given in the Santa's Works hpl 2 case has been re-
garded as the protection of intrinsic symbol value. What is intrinsic
symbol value? The court found no secondary meaning; therefore, it
is clear that symbol did not have source value. The injunction was
not granted for the reason of protecting the public from confusion
of source. Intrinsic symbol value illudes rational definition; however,
it would seem that it is a product that helps sell another product or
service. Assuming this to be true, then it is evident that to prevent
others from copying such symbol gives the originator a product
monopoly. The pros and cons of giving such a monopoly, as a matter
of public policy will be discussed in the conclusion.
B. Misappropriation
The Misappropriation doctrine introduced in the International
News"1 case places the emphasis upon the fairness of defendant's
copying. However, deciding what is fair or unfair creates a problem,
and also causes the courts to forget that the basic proposition is to
encourage competition which includes encouraging the right to
copy. 14 Limiting this right to copy should exist only when there is a
legitimate reason to do so. The reason for limiting the right to copy
could very well be decided on grounds of fairness; however, standards
as to what is fair or unfair must be considered in light of the basic
proposition that the right to copy encourages competition and that
sometimes such a policy might cause others economic injury.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
As stated earlier, the right to copy is of basic importance to the
maintenance of competition." 5 The right to copy places pressures on
the originator of a product to keep the price of his product low, its
quality up and his services adequate. However, certain traditional
exceptions to the right to copy have developed because it has been
recognized, as a matter of public policy, that the public should not be
deceived as to the true source of a particular product or service.110
Other theories have been introduced and discussed, and the courts
112. 282 App. Div. 328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953).
113. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
114. See 2 CALLmANN § 60.3.
115. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
116. See Part II supra.
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have given protection even though there was no showing of source
confusion.117 The rationale behind these theories is that the originator
has acquired some sort of property right, and therefore, courts urge
limitation on the right to copy on the idea of protecting an originator
from unfair or unethical practices. This note has analyzed these
theories as "a new exception to the right to copy." 118
Would it be beneficial to the public to give protection to an origi-
nator of a symbol or design which does not have source value, because
through repetition it has supposedly acquired a commercial mag-
netism all its own? Such a theory would give the originator exclusive
use of a product that helps sell another product. However, this would
in turn distort consumer choice. Advertising would no longer be
geared to create an awareness in the public's mind of the source of
the product. Such advertising would prevent the public from making
rational choices as to what products to buy. As a matter of policy,
such advertising serves no useful purpose to the public.
Acceptance of the dilution doctrine would necessarily require a
retraction from the basic policy of encouraging competition through
implementation of the right to copy. Enforcement of the dilution
doctrine would necessarily restrict different means which someone
could use to compete, without a rational basis for limiting the means
to compete. The only basis for limiting the right to copy would be
that the originator had spent time, effort and money in developing
some type of advertising symbol or design. Preventing dilution does
not serve the public in any other way. This is not a legitimate reason
for giving an originator a monopoly on such symbol or design. The
basic policy of encouraging competition is best served by encouraging
the right to copy.
If the new exception to the right to copy is to be accepted, then
such a decision should be made by the legislature. To do otherwise
simply confuses the courts in their application of the law of unfair
competition, and seriously limits the predictability of whether a
person has a right to copy in a particular fact situation.
If a statute is desirable, it should be drafted in such a way as to
set certain standards of permissible copying and should recognize
that protection is being given without any source confusion. It
should be realized that such restriction on the right to copy goes
beyond common law principles.
If a legislature wants to protect one's investment in advertising
which under the traditional doctrines would not be protected, then
117. See discussion supra of 1) Dilution; 2) Intrinsic Symbol Value; and 3)
Misappropriation.
118. See Part III supra.
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possibly a statute could be drafted giving protection when a certain
minimum amount of money has been spent by an originator. Perhaps
the minimum amount would have to be spent in the market area of
that originator or in each market where the originator desires protec-
tion.
The statute might be drafted to prohibit all copying unless the
copier is unduly restricted in his ability to compete with the origina-
tor. If the copier has to copy in order to compete with the originator,
then the copier could be given the right to copy.
In any event, it should be remembered that restricting the right to
copy beyond the traditional exceptions is not beneficial to the public
and to give such exclusive use gives product monopolies. This, in turn,
is contrary to the basic policy of encouraging competition by encour-
aging the right to copy.
Washington University Open Scholarship
